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Abstract
We study the e⁄ects of red tape and corruption in a model of
occupational choice, entry regulation and imperfect capital markets.
Red tape is the set of rules and regulations that private agents are
obliged to comply with in order to engage in entrepreneurial activity.
Corruption is the payment of bribes to public o¢ cials for the pur-
pose of circumventing red tape. Capital market imperfections are the
asymmetries of information between borrowers and lenders about the
returns to entrepreneurship. We show that both red tape and corrup-
tion deter entrepreneurial activity, but that only corruption a⁄ects ￿-
nancial market outcomes, including the probability of bankruptcy and
the costs of verifying bankruptcy claims. The existence of corruption
compounds the e⁄ects of both aggregate uncertainty and capital mar-
ket frictions, each of which compounds the e⁄ects of corruption. We
examine the interactions between red tape and corruption when both
are endogenous to the bureaucratic process.
1 Introduction
Recent years have witnessed a burgeoning literature on the economics of cor-
ruption. Underlying this has been a growing awareness of the importance of
governance in determining the functioning of society￿ s public institutions.1
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1The concepts of governance and corruption are intimately connected: just as bad gov-
ernance fosters corruption, so corruption undermines good governance. Other important
aspects of governance include transparency, accountability, political stability, social order,
the rule of law and the like.
1A hallmark of the literature is its departure from the standard economic
paradigm of honest, law-abiding agents whose pursuit of what is best for
themselves entails no malevolence towards others; in place of this is a much
harsher, more cynical environment, where agents are often devious, preda-
tory and subversive. The issue of corruption has become a leading concern
amongst international development agencies with the recognition that good
quality governance is vital if the poorer nations of the world are to stand
any chance of escaping from their predicament. In this paper we study how
corruption can undermine economic performance through its connection with
entry regulation, occupational choice and ￿nancial market imperfections.2
Corruption can occur on various scales, in many shapes and forms and at
all levels within public o¢ ce. It is generally de￿ned as the abuse of author-
ity by public o¢ cials for personal gains. One manifestation of this is when
state-appointed bureaucrats exploit their powers of discretion, delegated to
them by the government, to further their own interests by engaging in illegal,
or unauthorised, rent-seeking activities.3 The incentives to do this re￿ ect the
hierarchical structure of public organisations, within which there are almost
inevitable con￿ icts of interest and asymmetries of information between supe-
riors and subordinates. As a consequence, the objectives of the former may
be compromised by the decisions of the latter to act strategically and dishon-
estly in pursuit of their own hidden agenda. At a partial equilibrium level,
much research has been devoted towards understanding the microfounda-
tions of such behaviour and the implications for e¢ ciency and welfare (e.g.,
Banerjee 1997; Carrillo 2000; Klitgaard 1988, 1990; Rose-Ackerman 1975,
1978, 1999; Shleifer and Vishny 1993). At a general equilibrium level, other
research has been directed towards analysing the macroeconomics of mis-
governance, including the relationship between corruption and development
(e.g., Acemoglu and Verdier 1998, 2000; Blackburn et al. 2006; Blackburn
and Forgues-Puccio 2007; Ehrlich and Lui 1999; Murphy et al. 1991; Sarte
2000).
Empirical work on corruption has ￿ ourished over recent years.4 This has
2For surveys of the corruption literature, see Aidt (2003), Bardhan (1997),
Jain (2001), Rose-Ackerman (1999) and Tanzi (1998). For an apprecia-
tion of the importance of corruption to international policy makers, see the
World Bank and IMF web-sites, www.worldbank.org/publicsector/anticorrupt and
www.imf.org/external/np/exp/facts/gov.
3This is referred to as bureaucratic corruption, as distinct from political and legislative
corruption which may also arise within the public sector (e.g., Jain 2001). By rent-seeking
one typically means the extraction of bribes, and it has been estimated by the World Bank
(2004) that more than $1 trillion is paid in bribes each year around the world.
4For more detailed discussions of the main issues involved and the main results obtained,
see Jain (1998), Lambsdor⁄ (1999, 2005), and Treisman (2000).
2been due to the publication of several cross-country datasets that are widely
regarded as providing reliable measures of corrupt activity. These datasets, or
corruption indices, have been compiled by various international organisations
based on questionnaire surveys sent to networks of correspondents around the
world.5 Each one gives a ranking of countries in terms of the extent to which
corruption is perceived to exist. Whilst di⁄ering in their precise construction
and whilst being susceptible to the usual caveats associated with survey data,
the indices are all highly correlated with each other and all highly correlated
with key economic variables, properties which suggest that they are, in fact,
measuring the same phenomenon and that problems of bias are not a major
issue. Given this, a number of authors - including Gyimah-Brempong (2002),
Keefer and Knack (1997), Knack and Keefer (1995), Li et al. (2000), Mauro
(1995) and Sachs and Warner (1997) - have estimated signi￿cant adverse
e⁄ects of corruption on economic performance. These and other studies also
provide evidence on various ways in which corruption might take hold, such
as lowering rates of investment (e.g., Mauro 1995), creating obstacles to doing
business (e.g., World Bank 2002), reducing in￿ ows of foreign investment (e.g.,
Wei 2000) and causing misallocations of public expenditures (e.g., Mauro
1997; Tanzi and Davoodi 1997).6
To many observers, bureaucratic corruption is an inevitable product of the
administrative machinery of state intervention. In many areas of economic
activity, private individuals must comply with various rules and regulations
that are costly in terms of time and e⁄ort, e¢ ciency and productivity. These
institutional hurdles - the red tape of bureaucracy - provide an opportunity
for rent-seeking as individuals may be willing to pay bribes to circumvent
them. It has been argued that, because of this, corruption may actually
do more good than harm (e.g., Huntington 1968; Le⁄ 1964; Leys 1970; Lui
1985). Known as the ￿speed money￿hypothesis, the argument contends that
bribery can be a means of improving e¢ ciency by helping to overcome cum-
bersome regulations that create obstacles to doing business. Whilst plausible
at ￿rst glance, the hypothesis can be challenged on both conceptual and em-
5The most commonly-used index is the Corruption Perception Index of Transparency
International. The same organisation provides a Bribe Payers Index, whilst the World
Bank reports a Graft Index. Various other indices include those of Business International
Corporation, Political Risk Services Incorporated, the World Development Report and the
Institute of Management Development.
6From the opposite perspective, it has been estimated that a signi￿cant proportion of
the variations in corruption indices can be explained by variations in per capita income
levels (e.g., Ades and Di Tella 1999; Fisman and Gatti 2002; Frechette 2001; Montinola and
Jackman 1999; Paldam 2002; Rauch and Evans 2000; and Treisman 2000). This suggests
that corruption and development are linked in a relationship that is not only negative but
also two-way causal. A theoretical analysis of this is given in Blackburn et al. (2006).
3pirical grounds. Conceptually, there are at least two main problems: ￿rst,
although bribery may speed up individual transactions with bureaucrats,
both the sizes of bribes and the number of transactions may increase so as to
produce an overall net loss in e¢ ciency; second, and more fundamentally, the
distortions that bribes are meant to mitigate are often the result of corrupt
practices to begin with and should therefore be treated as endogenous, rather
than exogenous, to the bureaucratic process. Empirically, the evidence o⁄ers
very little support for the hypothesis: in Ades and Di Tella (1997), Mauro
(1995) and Meon and Sekkat (2005) it is found that the correlation between
growth and corruption is consistently negative (and particularly strong) in
samples of countries with reputedly high levels of red tape, weak rules of law
and widespread government ine¢ ciencies (the type of environment where the
argument is most relevant); in Kaufman and Wei (2000) it is found that the
use of bribes to speed up the bureaucratic process is largely self-defeating
as the amount of time negotiating bribes increases. Based on these observa-
tions, the prevailing consensus is that corruption does little, or nothing, to
improve e¢ ciency and, if anything, puts sand, rather than grease, into the
wheels of bureaucracy.
It is possible that red tape has some positive social value, though the
reasons are not yet very well understood. One argument is that it may func-
tion as a screening device to reveal information and to improve outcomes
in otherwise unregulated markets (e.g., Acemoglu and Verdier 2000; Baner-
jee 1997; Guriev 2004). Another is that it may serve to contain corrupt
activity by limiting the scope for discretion and favouritism on the part of
bureaucrats through complex rules and procedures (e.g., Wilson 1989). As
indicated above, the main problem is that the amount of red tape is typi-
cally determined by those who stand to bene￿t from producing too much of
it in their quest to extract rents. And signi￿cantly, it is the poorer, more
corrupt, countries of the world that appear to be mired with regulations in
this way. The literature on corruption is replete with examples - particu-
larly from developing and transition economies - of how red tape can impose
signi￿cant costs on ￿rms, of how corruption can do the same, of how ￿rms of-
ten seek to avoid red tape by complying in corruption and of how corruption
appears to proliferate the amount of red tape (e.g., Bardhan 1984; Bhag-
wati 1993; Brunetti et al. 1997; De Soto 1989, 2000; Djankov et al. 2000;
Kaufman 1997a,b; Mbaku 2000; Shleifer 1997; Sjaifudian 1997; World Bank
2002, 2006). The following is just a handful of observations that have been
made. De Soto (1989) recounts an investigation by the Institute for Liberty
and Democracy into the costs of setting up a small, ￿ctitious ￿rm in Peru,
a venture that took 289 days of full-time work, with bribe payments being
asked for on 10 occasions (and being unavoidable in 2 instances). Kaufman
4(1997a) reveals that 64 (44) percent of ￿rms surveyed in the Ukraine (Russia)
admitted to paying bribes to overcome red tape, and that 96 (43) percent
of ￿rms confessed to making illegal payments to obtain o¢ cial licenses and
permits. Brunetti et al. (1997) observes that, in a survey of ￿rms around
the world, red tape and corruption were ranked amongst the highest major
obstacles to doing business (especially in the less developed regions). Simi-
larly, the World Bank (2002) reports that between 50 and 80 percent of ￿rms
surveyed in developing and transition economies considered red tape and
corruption to be signi￿cant constraints on their activities. In a subsequent
study, the World Bank (2006) estimates that the average length of time to
register a new business is usually more than 100 days in the poorer countries
of the world, compared with less than 30 days in most of the richer nations.
This accords with the results of Djankov et al. (2002) who use cross-country
data on entry regulations to show that the costs of obtaining legal status to
operate a ￿rm decrease uniformly with per capita GDP. Finally, the World
Bank (2006) also notes instances where reducing red tape (and presumably
corruption along with this) appears to have had signi￿cant positive e⁄ects
on business activity, as exempli￿ed in Colombia and Ethiopia which experi-
enced, respectively, 16 and 46 percent increases in new business registrations
over a single year period following the simpli￿cation of entry regulations.
Red tape and corruption in entry regulation may be viewed as acting like
taxes on business activity. Unlike other forms of taxation, however, the costs
involved are typically incurred before production takes place and, in the case
of corruption, are the result of illegal, clandestine transactions with rent-
seeking public o¢ cials. As indicated above, the cost of red tape involves a
large, non-pecuniary element in terms of the time and e⁄ort spent on comply-
ing with various administrative procedures to obtain o¢ cial licences, permits
and other documents of authorisation. By contrast, the cost of corruption
is predominantly the monetary expenditure on bribe payments intended to
achieve the same objective. This di⁄erence can be important, especially
when individuals are resource-constrained and require external ￿nance for
their operations. Under such circumstances, extra bribe payments may de-
mand extra borrowing, in which case the functioning of ￿nancial markets
may play a crucial role in determining the e⁄ects of corruption. The pre-
sumption, of course, is that these e⁄ects will be more pronounced the more
imperfect are these markets. Financial market imperfections may arise for a
number of reasons such as problems of moral hazard and adverse selection
associated with asymmetric information, and problems of default risk cre-
ated by weak powers of contract enforcement. The consequent uncertainty
for lenders￿about the repayment of loans can lead to an increase in the cost
of borrowing and a rationing of the amount of credit. Signi￿cantly, ￿nancial
5market imperfections, like red tape and corruption, are characteristic features
of less developed economies.
The foregoing discussion provides the motivation for this paper which
addresses issues of red tape, corruption and ￿nance in a model of occupa-
tional choice and entry regulation. Private individuals choose between two
alternative activities that di⁄er in terms of the payo⁄s expected, the risks
involved, the skills demanded, the loans required and the regulations applied.
Borrowing and lending take place through competitive ￿nancial intermedi-
aries according to the terms and conditions of ￿nancial contracts. Capital
market imperfections exist because of asymmetric information between bor-
rowers and lenders, the latter of whom engage in costly state veri￿cation to
prevent false claims of bankruptcy by the former. Corruption takes the form
of bribe payments by private agents to public o¢ cials in return for being
freed from red tape associated with the higher skilled, more entrepreneurial
occupation. We show how both red tape and corruption reduce entry into
this occupation, but that corruption has other implications as well. Speci￿-
cally, corruption a⁄ects ￿nancial market outcomes. It does so by increasing
the probability of bankruptcy amongst entrepreneurs and, with this, the ex-
pected veri￿cation cost of lenders. As a consequence, corruption compounds
the problem of capital market imperfections and exacerbates the e⁄ects of
uncertainty. At the same time, the greater is the extent of these imperfec-
tions and the greater is the degree of uncertainty, the more pronounced are
the e⁄ects of corruption. Against this background, we address the ￿speed
money￿hypothesis by illustrating and then challenging it.
To the extent that we model corruption as distorting occupational choice,
our analysis is in the spirit of Murphy et al. (1991) and Ehrlich and Lui (1999)
who show how the prospect of rent extraction can lead to a misallocation of
skills and talent in the economy. Our analysis may also be viewed within the
context of the modern literature on income distribution which emphasises the
role of capital market imperfections in determining occupational opportuni-
ties (e.g., Aghion and Bolton 1997; Banerjee and Newman 1993; Blackburn
and Bose 2001; Galor and Zeira 1993). In terms of its contribution to the
governance literature, the analysis provides insights into the connection be-
tween red tape and corruption, and the interactions of these phenomena with
aspects of ￿nance and uncertainty.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. In Section 2 we
present a simple model of occupational choice and ￿nancial intermediation
in a regulation-free and corruption-free environment. In Section 3 we re-
examine this environment in the presence of red tape. In Section 4 we do the
same in the presence of corruption. In Section 5 we study the link between
red tape and corruption. In Section 6 we make a few concluding remarks.
62 The Basic Framework
We consider a small open economy in which there is a continuum of agents
measuring a size of unit mass. Each agent has the same risk neutral pref-
erences and the same zero endowment of wealth. Productive activity by an
agent is based on a choice of project, or occupation, that gives access to a
technology for generating output. For certain types of project to be under-
taken, loans must be acquired from ￿nancial intermediaries under the terms
and conditions of mutually agreeable ￿nancial contracts. Capital market im-
perfections exist because of asymmetric information between borrowers and
lenders. In more detail, the model is described as follows.
Each agent is faced with a choice between two types of production project.
The ￿rst type involves the use of some basic (or traditional) technology in
some routine activity that is both costless and riskless for an agent. This is a
subsistence occupation that requires zero capital outlay and zero e⁄ort, and
that yields A0 > 0 units of output with certainty.7 The second type entails
the operation of a more advanced (or modern) technology in an entrepre-
neurial venture that is expected to be more productive, but that is also both
costly and risky. This is a skilled occupation that requires I > 0 units of
capital outlay and ￿ > 0 units of e⁄ort, and that yields a stochastic amount
of output of A1(1 + ￿), where A1 > A0 and ￿ is an identically and indepe-
dently distributed random variable (a technology shock). For simplicity, we
specify ￿ to be uniformly distributed over the interval [￿a;a] with probabil-
ity density function f(￿) = 1
2a (a < 1). Evidently, since the expected value
of ￿ is zero, then the expected return from the advanced project is A1 which
we assume to be greater than the safe return from the basic project, A0. A
measure of uncertainty associated with the former is given by the parameter
a, an increase in which corresponds to a mean-preserving spread in the dis-
tribution of ￿ (i.e., an increase in the variance of the shock, which causes an
increase in the variance of project returns). The amount of e⁄ort, ￿, needed
to operate the advanced technology depends (inversely) on an agent￿ s tech-
nical capabilities (skills, knowledge, expertise and the like), attributes that
are unimportant in the subsistence occupation. We suppose that agents are
heterogeneously endowed with these attributes, implying a distribution of ￿
which we simplify, as above, to being uniform on the interval [0;e] with prob-
ability density function g(￿) = 1
e (e > 0). Thus
R e1
e0 g(￿)d￿ =
e1￿e0
e provides a
measure of agents for whom ￿ 2 (e0;e1).
In order to engage in entrepreneurial activity, an agent must acquire a
7The assumption that neither capital nor e⁄ort is needed to engage in this occupation
can be relaxed without altering the results of the analysis. The assumption serves merely
as a normalisation that saves on notation.
7loan of size I as external funding for the ￿xed capital outlay. Loans are made
by competitive ￿nancial intermediaries at a contractual interest rate of R.
The loan repayment for an agent is therefore (1+R)I. Borrowing and lend-
ing take place prior to the realisation of project returns. Subsequently, only
entrepreneurs are able to directly observe these returns. This ex post infor-
mational asymmetry (the source of ￿nancial market imperfections) implies
that an entrepreneur may try to default on his loan repayment by claiming
falsely that he is bankrupt due to a bad realisation of ￿. The solution to this
problem involves costly state veri￿cation, whereby a lender spends resources
on investigating a borrower whenever bankruptcy is declared with the view
to observing and claiming all of the borrower￿ s income (e.g., Diamond 1984;
Gale and Hellwig 1985; Townsend 1979).8 We denote this veri￿cation cost
by c which provides a measure of the extent of capital market imperfections.
The utility of an agent that engages in subsistence activity is simply A0.
The utility of an agent that engages in entrepreneurial activity is
u =
￿
A1(1 + ￿) ￿ (1 + R)I ￿ ￿ if ￿ ￿ ￿;
￿￿ if ￿ < ￿: (1)
The term ￿ de￿nes a critical value of ￿, below which an agent is bankrupt and
above which an agent is non-bankrupt. The former event occurs if A1(1+￿) <
(1+R)I, while the latter event occurs if A1(1+￿) ￿ (1+R)I. Accordingly,
￿ is determined from the condition
A1(1 + ￿) = (1 + R)I: (2)
Naturally, ￿ is increasing in R: ceteris paribus, the higher is the interest rate
on loans, the more productive must be a borrower if he is to be able to make
his loan repayment. The probability that he is unable to do this - i.e., the
probability of bankruptcy - is given by ￿ =
R ￿
￿a f(￿)d￿ = ￿+a
2a . It follows
that, prior to observing ￿, an entrepreneur￿ s expected utility is
E(u) =
Z a
￿
[A1(1 + ￿) ￿ (1 + R)I]f(￿)d￿ ￿ ￿: (3)
An agent will become an entrepreneur provided that E(u) ￿ A0, a condition
that we examine shortly.
8As in some other analyses (e.g., Agenor and Aizenman 1998a,b; Aizenman and Powell
2003; Gertler and Gilchrist 1993), one could also think of lenders as incurring costs of
contract enforcement in the sense of having to spend resources (such as legal fees) on
seizing the incomes (and any collateral) of bankrupt borrowers.
8Financial intermediaries make loans to agents in the knowledge that bank-
ruptcy may be declared. If so, then agents￿claims are veri￿ed and intermedi-
aries appropriate all of the proceeds from projects, less the costs of veri￿ca-
tion. Bankruptcy is declared only if ￿ < ￿, in which case an intermediary￿ s
return from lending is A1(1 + ￿) ￿ c. Alternatively, if ￿ ￿ ￿, then the in-
termediary is paid back in full, earning a return of (1 + R)I. Intermediaries
have access to a perfectly elastic supply of loanable funds at the exogenous
world rate of interest, r, implying a cost of borrowing of (1+r)I for each loan
that is made. Competition between intermediaries means that they operate
at zero expected pro￿t. This break-even condition is given by
(1 + r)I =
Z a
￿
(1 + R)If(￿)d￿ +
Z ￿
￿a
[A1(1 + ￿) ￿ c]f(￿)d￿: (4)
For any given ￿, this expression determines the contractual interest rate on
loans, R.
Given (4), we may re-write (3) as
E(u) =
Z a
￿a
A1(1 + ￿)f(￿)d￿ ￿
Z ￿
￿a
cf(￿)d￿ ￿ (1 + r)I ￿ ￿
= A1 ￿ (1 + r)I ￿
￿
￿ + a
2a
￿
c ￿ ￿: (5)
Accordingly, the condition for an agent to take on a loan and run the ad-
vanced project is that A1￿(1+r)I￿
￿
￿+a
2a
￿
c￿￿ ￿ A0. This de￿nes a critical
value of ￿, denoted ￿, that satis￿es
￿ = A1 ￿ A0 ￿ (1 + r)I ￿
￿
￿ + a
2a
￿
c: (6)
The advanced project is undertaken by any agent for whom ￿ ￿ ￿, whilst
the basic project is undertaken by any agent for whom ￿ > ￿. The total
population of entrepreneurs is therefore n =
R ￿
0 g(￿)d￿ = ￿
e.9 The expression
in (6) implies that ￿ is a decreasing function of
￿
￿+a
2a
￿
c, the expected veri￿-
cation cost, which is passed on by lenders to borrowers. This cost is higher
the higher is c (meaning that more resources must be spent in the event of
9If ￿ < 0 (￿ > e), then no (every) agent is an entrepreneur. Whilst this is perfectly
feasible, it is possible to rule out such an outcome by imposing appropriate restrictions
on parameter values. This follows from the fact that the lowest (highest) value of ￿ is
A1 ￿ A0 ￿ (1 + r)I ￿ c (A1 ￿ A0 ￿ (1 + r)I), corresponding to the case in which ￿ = a
(￿ = ￿a). It turns out that ￿ ￿ 0 by virtue of the restriction A1 ￿ A0 ￿ (1 + r)I ￿ c ￿ 0
that we appeal to later in solving the optimal loan contracting problem.
9veri￿cation) and the higher is ￿ (meaning that veri￿cation is more likely).
An increase in either of these terms will therefore reduce the population of
entrepreneurs.
Subtraction of (4) from (2) yields
(R ￿ r)I =
Z ￿
￿a
[A1(1 + ￿) ￿ A1(1 + ￿) + c]f(￿)d￿: (7)
This expression shows the interest rate spread between lending and borrow-
ing.10 The size of spread depends on how much a lender expects to lose when
a borrower goes bankrupt and is unable to make his full loan repayment (i.e.,
when ￿ < ￿). To be sure, observe from (2) that the ￿rst integral term on
the right-hand-side of (7) is equal to
R ￿
￿a(1 + R)f(￿)d￿ which measures the
expected amount of non-repayment as a result of bankruptcy. Conversely,
the second and third integral terms on the right-hand-side of (7) give the
expected amount of income that is claimed from a bankrupt borrower, net of
veri￿cation costs. Accordingly, (7) implies that the contractual interest rate
on loans is set as a simple mark-up over intermediaries￿cost of borrowing,
where the size of mark-up is equal to the expected net income lost due to
bankruptcy. This mark-up rule may be simpli￿ed to
RI = rI +
A1(￿ + a)2
4a
+
￿
￿ + a
2a
￿
c: (8)
As above, there is a positive relationship between R and ￿: ceteris paribus,
intermediaries set a higher contractual interest rate the more likely it is that
bankruptcy will occur.
The expressions in (2) and (8) de￿ne a simultaneous system of two inde-
pendent relationships between R and ￿. An analysis of this system leads to
the following result.
Lemma 1 Given that (1 + r)I + c ￿ A1 <
(1+r)I
1￿a , 9 a unique ￿ 2 (￿a;a)
and a unique R > r that solve (2) and (8).
Proof. Combining (2) and (8) yields the quadratic equation
0 = A1￿
2 ￿ 2(A1a ￿ c)￿ ￿ [4A1a ￿ A1a
2 ￿ 4a(1 + r)I ￿ 2ac]:
Hence
￿ = a ￿
c
A1
￿
p
4A1a[A1 ￿ (1 + r)I ￿ c] + c2
A1
:
10Results of this sort are fairly standard for the type of uncertain ￿nancial environment
that we are considering (e.g., Agenor and Aizenman 1998a,b; Aizenman and Powell 2003;
Azariadis and Chakraborty 1999).
10A su¢ cient condition for ruling out complex roots is A1 ￿ (1 + r)I ￿ c ￿ 0.
Given this, together with the fact that ￿ ￿ a, the only possible solution
for ￿ is when
p
￿
A1 enters negatively in the above equation. The restriction
A1 <
(1+r)I
1￿a ensures that ￿ ￿ ￿a as well. Since the solution for ￿ is unique,
then so too is the solution for R.
We write the solution for ￿ as
￿ = a ￿
c
A1
￿
p
4A1a[A1 ￿ (1 + r)I ￿ c] + c2
A1
￿ A(a;c;I): (9)
The solution for R is then given similarly by R = R(a;c;I). Substituting (9)
into (6) also yields
￿ = A1 ￿ A0 ￿ (1 + r)I ￿
￿
A(a;c;I) + a
2a
￿
c ￿ E(a;c;I): (10)
The two key parameters in the model as it presently stands are a and
c. As indicated earlier, the former - which determines the spread of the
distribution of ￿ - provides a measure of uncertainty, whilst the latter - which
is the cost of veri￿cation - acts as an indicator of capital market frictions. It
is straightforward to establish the following result.
Proposition 1 The greater is the degree of uncertainty and/or the greater is
the extent of capital market imperfections, the higher is the probability that
an entrepreneur will go bankrupt and the lower is the number of agents who
choose to become entrepreneurs.
Proof. The probability of bankruptcy is ￿ =
A(￿)+a
2a , and the population
of entrepreneurs is n =
E(￿)
e . From (9) and (10), @￿
@a =
[aAa(￿)￿A(￿)]
2a2 > 0 and
@￿
@c =
Ac(￿)
2a > 0, whilst @n
@a =
Ea(￿)
e < 0 and @n
@c =
Ec(￿)
e < 0.
The e⁄ects of uncertainty are due to the fact that the loan repayment is a
non-linear (speci￿cally, concave) function of ￿. To be sure, recall that the
repayment is A1(1+￿) if ￿ < ￿, but 1+R if ￿ ￿ ￿. The expected repayment
is therefore reduced by a mean-preserving spread of ￿.11 Intermediaries com-
pensate for this by charging a higher interest rate on loans (Ra(￿) > 0) which
increases the likelihood that bankruptcy will occur and so raises the expected
11This is simply an example of the well-known result of Rothschild and Stiglitz (1971)
that the expected value of a concave (convex) function of some random variable is decreased
(increased) be a mean-preserving spread in the distribution of that variable
11veri￿cation cost. Since this reduces the expected pro￿ts from entrepreneurial
activity, fewer agents have an incentive to engage in this activity. The e⁄ects
of ￿nancial market imperfections operate in a similar way. An increase in
c increases the expected veri￿cation cost which raises the contractual inter-
est rate (Rc(￿) > 0) and makes bankruptcy more likely. Faced with lower
expected returns from borrowing, fewer agents ￿nd it pro￿table to take on
loans. For future reference, we also note that an increase in the size of loan
causes an increase in the probability of bankruptcy and a decrease in the
number of entrepreneurs: that is, AI(￿) > 0 and EI(￿) < 0.
This completes our description of the basic framework that we use during
our subsequent analysis. In that analysis we seek to introduce aspects of
regulation and governance, and to examine how such aspects might bear on
the issues of ￿nance, bankruptcy and occupational choice.
3 Red Tape
As commented on earlier, individuals often spend a substantial amount of
resources - especially, in terms of time and e⁄ort - on going through various
procedures and regulations before they are entitled to engage in a particular
activity or business. As also mentioned earlier, the bene￿ts of red tape are
not very well understood, though some plausible candidates exist. That some
positive level of red tape might be socially-optimal is an issue worth-pursuing,
but it is not one that we address explictly in the present analysis. Rather,
our interest lies elsewhere, being focused towards the relationship between
red tape and corruption, and the implications of this for ￿nancial market
outcomes and entrepreneurial opportunities.
We introduce red tape as the set of institutional regulations that agents
must comply with in order to obtain licenses to undertake the advanced
project. Responsibility for implementing these regulations and issuing such
licenses lies in the hands of public o⁄cials (civil servants or bureaucrats) using
the authority delegated to them by the government.12 We assume that the
process of license acquisition is costly for an agent, demanding t units of his
time or e⁄ort. The greater is the amount of red tape, the more complicated
12As in other analyses (e.g., Blackburn et al. 2006; Guriev 2004; Rivera-Batiz 2001;
Sarte 2000), we take the distinction between private and public citizens as given, and do
not consider how individuals might choose their own status (i.e., choose between private
and public sector occupations). This abstraction serves to simplify and focus the analysis,
and may be thought of as re￿ ecting an allocation process that is either purely random
or else based on di⁄erences in individual attributes (e.g., endowments of job-appropriate
skills).
12or the more drawn-out is this process, and the more time or more e⁄ort is
required from the agent. For the moment, we treat t as exogenous.
Given the above, we re-write (1) - the utility of an agent who becomes
an entrepreneur - as
u =
￿
A1(1 + ￿) ￿ (1 + R)I ￿ ￿ ￿ t if ￿ ￿ ￿;
￿￿ ￿ t if ￿ < ￿: (11)
Like before, ￿ is the value of ￿ below (above) which bankruptcy occurs (does
not occur). This critical value continues to satisfy the condition in (2). It
follows that, in place of (3), the expected utility of an entrepreneur is
E(u) =
Z a
￿
[A1(1 + ￿) ￿ (1 + R)I]f(￿)d￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ t: (12)
Financial intermediaries are still subject to the zero pro￿t condition in
(4). Combining this with (12) yields the following revised version of (5):
E(u) =
Z a
￿a
A1(1 + ￿)f(￿)d￿ ￿
Z ￿
￿a
cf(￿)d￿ ￿ (1 + r)I ￿ ￿ ￿ t
= A1 ￿ (1 + r)I ￿
￿
￿ + a
2a
￿
c ￿ ￿ ￿ t: (13)
An agent continues to opt for an entrepreneurial (rather than subsistence) oc-
cupation if E(u) ￿ A0. Under present circumstances, this condition amounts
to A1 ￿(1+r)I ￿
￿
￿+a
2a
￿
c￿￿￿t ￿ A0, from which we deduce a new critical
value of ￿, denoted b ￿, such that entrepreneurship is chosen (not chosen) by
any agent for whom ￿ ￿b ￿ (￿ >b ￿). That is, instead of (6), we have
b ￿ = A1 ￿ A0 ￿ (1 + r)I ￿
￿
￿ + a
2a
￿
c ￿ t: (14)
As before, b ￿ is a decreasing function of
￿
￿+a
2a
￿
c, the expected cost of veri￿ca-
tion. Unlike before, b ￿ is also a decreasing function of t, the amount of time
and e⁄ort spent on going through red tape.
Since (2) and (4) still hold, so too do (7) and (8), implying that (2) and (8)
continue to determine the solutions for ￿ and R, irrespective of other changes
in the model. Accordingly, Lemma 1 still applies, as does the expression for
￿ in (9). In contrast, (10) is replaced by
b ￿ = A1 ￿ A0 ￿ (1 + r)I ￿
￿
A(a;c;I) + a
2a
￿
c ￿ t ￿ E(a;c;I) ￿ t: (15)
The following result is now added to those in Proposition 1.
13Proposition 2 An increase in the amount of red tape has no e⁄ect on the
probability of bankruptcy, but reduces the number of agents who choose to
become entrepreneurs.
Proof. The probability of bankrupcty is ￿ =
A(￿)+a
2a , and the population of
entrepreneurs is n =
E(￿)￿t
e . From (9) and (15), @￿
@t = 0, whilst @n
@t = ￿1.
Since red tape does not a⁄ect the size of loan that individuals need to run
the advanced project, ￿nancial market outcomes - the terms and conditions
of borrowing, and the probability of bankruptcy - are unchanged with the
introduction of red tape. But the extra time and e⁄ort that needs to be
spent on going through red tape means that fewer agents are willing to take
on this project. There is, of course, an obvious implication of this.
Corollary 1 Entrepreneurial activity is lower in the presence of red tape
than in the absence of red tape.
Proof. From (15), E(￿) ￿ t < E(￿) for any t > 0.
Naturally, as the model presently stands, the socially optimal amount of
red tape is zero since any positive value of t acts as a pure cost to individuals,
some of whom are induced to choose the subsistence occupation which they
would not choose otherwise. As indicated already, we do not mean this
feature - which arises by design - to be taken too literally since there may
be instances where red tape has some social value. In principle, the model
could be extended to allow for this, though such an exercise is unnecessary
for the main purpose of our analysis. For this reason, we prefer to work with
the model as it is and keep the analysis tightly focused on the issues of most
interest to us.13
13As a simple illustration of how the model could be extended, suppose that productive
activity associated with the advanced project generates some negative externalities for all
agents (e.g., damages to the environment). The role of red tape is to ensure that project
investors comply with certain regulations (e.g., environmental safeguards) designed to
mitigate such adverse side e⁄ects. Let X = x(b ￿
e) be a measure of these externalities and
v(X) be the disutility incurred from them. The natural assumptions to make are that
x0(￿) > 0 and v0(￿) > 0 (i.e., higher levels of productive activity imply greater externalities
which imply greater disutility). Given these modi￿cations, it is straightforward to repeat
the above analysis and to determine a positive value of t that maximises social welfare
(i.e., the sum of all agents￿expected utilities).
144 Corruption
According to the above description of events, the cost to an individual of ac-
quiring a license for undertaking the advanced project is the time and e⁄ort
spent on going through red tape: the license, itself, is issued free of charge.
In what follows we consider an alternative environment in which individuals
make themselves eligible for entrepeneurial activity by bribing public o¢ cials:
the cost of a license is now the amount of bribe that is paid. This kickback
may be given two interpretations. The ￿rst is that it is the necessary pay-
ment demanded by bureaucrats who have the monopoly power to issue or
withhold licenses at will. The second is that it is the optional payment which
an individual can make as a means of circumventing red tape. In terms of our
immediate concerns, it makes no di⁄erence as to which interpretation is used
since our objective is simply to illustrate the e⁄ects of bribery. Subsequently,
however, we focus on the latter interpretation for reasons that will become
clear. Throughout our analysis we assume that bureaucrats are able to ex-
tract bribes without any risk of detection or punishment. This assumption
(used in other analyses) is intended primarily as a simpli￿cation, though it
is probably near the mark for many developing countries where the will and
wherewithal to stop corruption are relatively weak.
The immediate e⁄ect of bribery is to increase the size of loan that is
needed to engage in entrepreneurial activity. Let b denote the amount of
bribe that an individual pays. Then the size of loan is I + b. Given this, we
may proceed as before to determine the equilibrium outcomes in the economy.
The utility of an agent who becomes an entrepreneur is given by
u =
￿
A1(1 + ￿) ￿ (1 + R)(I + b) ￿ ￿ if ￿ ￿ e ￿;
￿￿ if ￿ < e ￿: (16)
As indicated by this expression, the critical value of ￿ at which bankruptcy
occurs - e ￿ - is di⁄erent from before. This value is now determined from the
condition
A1(1 + e ￿) = (1 + R)(I + b): (17)
Ceteris paribus, the higher is the bribe payment, the more productive must
be an agent if he is to repay his loan. It follows that the expected utility of
an entrepreneur is
E(u) =
Z a
e ￿
[A1(1 + ￿) ￿ (1 + R)(I + b)]f(￿)d￿ ￿ ￿: (18)
Zero pro￿ts for ￿nancial intermediaries implies
(1+r)(I +b) =
Z a
e ￿
(1+R)(I +b)f(￿)d￿+
Z e ￿
￿a
[A1(1+￿)￿c]f(￿)d￿: (19)
15Substituting this into (18) gives
E(u) =
Z a
￿a
A1(1 + ￿)f(￿)d￿ ￿
Z e ￿
￿a
cf(￿)d￿ ￿ (1 + r)(I + b) ￿ ￿
= A1 ￿ (1 + r)(I + b) ￿
￿
e ￿ + a
2a
￿
c ￿ ￿: (20)
If an agent is to choose an entrepreneurial occupation, then E(u) ￿ A0, or
A1 ￿ (1 + r)(I + b) ￿
￿
e ￿+a
2a
￿
c ￿ ￿ ￿ A0. From this, we deduce a new critical
value of ￿ -e ￿ - such that entrepreneurship is chosen (not chosen) by any agent
for whom ￿ ￿e ￿ (￿ >e ￿). That is,
e ￿ = A1 ￿ A0 ￿ (1 + r)(I + b) ￿
￿
e ￿ + a
2a
￿
c: (21)
Thus, under present circumstances,e ￿ is a decreasing function of both
￿
e ￿+a
2a
￿
c
and b, the expected veri￿cation cost and bribe payment.
Subtraction of (19) from (17) yields the interest rate spread between
lending and borrowing,
(R ￿ r)(I + b) =
Z e ￿
￿a
[A1(1 + e ￿) ￿ A1(1 + ￿) + c]f(￿)d￿: (22)
Equivalently, we have
R(I + b) = r(I + b) +
A1(e ￿ + a)2
4a
+
￿
e ￿ + a
2a
￿
c: (23)
An analysis of (17) and (23) reveals the following result.
Lemma 2 Given that (1 + r)(I + b) + c ￿ A1 <
(1+r)(I+b)
1￿a , 9 a unique
e ￿ 2 (￿a;a) and a unique R > r that solve (17) and (23).
Proof. Combining (17) and (23) yields the quadratic equation
0 = A1e ￿
2 ￿ 2(A1a ￿ c)e ￿ ￿ [4A1a ￿ A1a
2 ￿ 4a(1 + r)(I + b) ￿ 2ac]:
Hence
e ￿ = a ￿
c
A1
￿
p
4A1a[A1 ￿ (1 + r)(I + b) ￿ c] + c2
A1
:
A su¢ cient condition for ruling out complex roots is A1￿(1+r)(I+b)￿c ￿ 0.
Given this, together with the fact that e ￿ ￿ a, the only possible solution
for e ￿ is when
p
￿
A1 enters negatively in the above equation. The restriction
16A1 <
(1+r)I
1￿a ensures that e ￿ ￿ ￿a as well. Since the solution for e ￿ is unique,
then so too is the solution for R.
We write the solution for e ￿ as
e ￿ = a ￿
c
A1
￿
p
4A1a[A1 ￿ (1 + r)(I + b) ￿ c] + c2
A1
￿ A(a;c;I + b): (24)
Substituting this into (21) gives
e ￿ = A1 ￿ A0 ￿ (1 + r)(I + b) ￿
￿
A(a;c;I + b) + a
2a
￿
c ￿ E(a;c;I + b): (25)
Added to the ￿ndings in Prosposition 1 is the following result.
Proposition 3 An increase in the size of bribe payment causes an increase
in the probability of bankruptcy and a decrease in the number of agents who
choose to become entrepreneurs.
Proof. The probability of bankrupcty is ￿ =
A(￿)+a
2a , and the population
of entrepreneurs is n =
E(￿)
e . From (24) and (25), @￿
@b =
Ab(￿)
2a > 0, whilst
@n
@b = ￿(1 + r) ￿
Ab(￿)
2a < 0.
Higher bribes imply that agents must borrow more if they are to run the
advanced project. With a larger size of loan, an agent stands a greater
chance of bankruptcy. Higher bribes also reduce the expected payo⁄ from
entrepreneurship. They do so both directly (by raising the expected loan
repayment) and indirectly (by raising the expected veri￿cation cost). As
such, they deter agents from becoming entrepreneurs. These results have an
obvious implication.
Corollary 2 Bankruptcy is higher and entrepreneurial activity is lower in
the presence of corruption than in the absence of corruption.
Proof. From (24) and (25), A(￿;I + b) > A(￿;I) whilst E(￿;I + b) < E(￿;I)
for any b > 0.
A further implication may also be deduced.
Corollary 3 Corruption exacerbates the e⁄ects of uncertainty and capital
market imperfections, each of which exacerbates the e⁄ects of corruption.
17Proof. From (24), Aib(￿) > 0 and Abi(￿) > 0 (i = a;c). It follows that @￿
@i
and
￿ ￿@n
@i
￿ ￿ are increasing in b, and that @￿
@b and
￿ ￿@n
@b
￿
￿ are increasing in i.
Compared to our previous results, we see that bribery has a similar ef-
fect to red tape in discouraging entrepreneurial activity. In both cases this
activity is made more costly than it otherwise would be, though for di⁄er-
ent reasons: in the case of red tape agents must spend time and e⁄ort on
acquiring licenses to undertake the advanced project; in the case of bribery
agents must spend physical resources to obtain these licenses. This di⁄erence
implies that bribery, unlike red tape, a⁄ects ￿nancial market outcomes - in
particular, it causes an increase in the probability of bankruptcy amongst
entrepreneurs and, with this, an increase in the expected veri￿cation cost
of ￿nancial intermediaries. In this way, corruption serves to compound the
ine¢ ciencies of capital market imperfections. The e⁄ects of these imperfec-
tions are made more pronounced, as are the e⁄ects of uncertainty. At the
same time, the greater is the extent of capital market imperfections and/or
the greater is the degree of uncertainty, the stronger are the e⁄ects of cor-
ruption.
5 Endogenous Red Tape and Endogenous
Corruption
To this point in our analysis, we have treated both the amount of red tape
and the amount of bribe payment as exogenous and unrelated to each other.
This has been useful for expositional purposes, allowing us to isolate the
mechanisms at work in each case and to identify some important di⁄erences
between these. It is well-recognised, however, that red tape and corruption
are often intimately connected through the deliberate, purposeful decisions
of public o¢ cials. As we have already indicated, this is because red tape
o⁄ers the opportunity for o¢ cials to extract bribes as an alternative means
by which individuals are able to obtain the legal status to conduct business.
In the analysis that follows we seek to explore this connection.
Our starting point is to consider the case in which agents can choose
between going through red tape or paying bribes to bureaucrats in their
endeavour to become entrepreneurs. From (13) and (20), the latter option
will be preferred if (1 + r)b + e ￿
2ac < ￿
2ac + t, where e ￿ and ￿ are determined
in (24) and (9). For a given t, any b that satis￿es this condition will imply
an e ￿ in (25) which is less than the b ￿ in (15): that is, compared to red tape,
bribery will discourage fewer agents from becoming entrepreneurs. This is
18essentially the ￿speed money￿hypothesis, according to which bribes can play
a positive role in helping to circumvent institutional hurdles that create costs
of doing business. As indicated earlier, this hypothesis may be challenged on
a number of grounds, and we single out just two points of contention. First,
as illustrated by our analysis, bribery may have e⁄ects that red tape does
not have. In our case these are the e⁄ects on ￿nancial market outcomes.
Thus, even if bribery admits a greater number of entrepreneurs, the fact
that there is also a greater probability of bankruptcy means that there may
be more entrepreneurs who fail to repay loans. Second, the institutional
obstacles that bribes are meant to overcome are typically the result of corrupt
practices to begin with. Indeed, they are often the very means by which
public o¢ cials engage in illegal pro￿teering. In other words, rather than
being taken as given by bureaucrats, t is an instrument of choice in the
extraction of rents. As such, the amount of red tape is appropriately seen as
being endogenous, rather than exogenous, to the bureaucratic process. Our
analysis now proceeds to take this into account.
To ￿x ideas, we imagine that bureaucrats act collusively in their rent-
seeking, forming an organised corruption network (an illegal syndicate) for
the maximisation of bribe income. The total value of this income is given by
B = b
Z e ￿
0
g(￿)d￿ =
be ￿
e
(26)
In solving its optimisation problem, the bureaucracy takes into account the
in￿ uence of its actions (its demand for bribes) on the size of the entrepre-
neurial sector (the number of bribe-payers, or bribe base). That is, it chooses
a b so as to maximise the value of B in (26), whilst recognising the e⁄ect of
b on e ￿ through (25). This leads to the following result.
Lemma 3 9 a unique value of b that maximises (26) subject to (25).
Proof. The ￿rst-order condition for the maximisation problem is
A1￿A0￿(1+r)(I+b)￿
￿
A(a;c;I + b) + a
2a
￿
c = b
￿
(1 + r) +
cAb(a;c;I + b)
2a
￿
:
Since A(￿) is an increasing convex function of b (i.e., Ab(￿) > 0 and Abb(￿) >
0), the left-hand-side (right-hand-side) of this expression is monotonically
decreasing (increasing) in b. Hence there is a single value of b that satis￿es
the expression.
Let b￿ denote the optimal bribe. Corresponding to this are an e ￿
￿ = A(￿;I+b￿)
and an e ￿
￿ = E(￿;I + b￿). Bureaucrats are able to extract b￿ by setting the
19amount of red tape at least equal to t￿, as determined from (1+r)b￿+ e ￿￿
2ac =
￿
2ac + t￿. This description of events is the opposite of that underlying the
￿speed money￿hypothesis: it is bribery that governs red tape, not vice versa;
and it is because bribes are chosen optimally that red tape is endogenous,
not exogenous, to the bureaucratic process. In short, bribery and red tape
go hand-in-hand, being merely two sides of the same coin.
Given the above, it is worth recalling our previous results which now
take on a rather di⁄erent complexion. No longer is it true to say that red
tape is unrelated to ￿nancial market outcomes. After all, the purpose of red
tape is to extract bribes, and bribes exert an important in￿ uence on such
outcomes. If the amount of red tape increases, then it does so because of
an increase in the demand for bribes which raises the probability of bank-
ruptcy for entrepreneurs and, with this, the expected cost of veri￿cation for
￿nancial intermediaries. As indicated already, there is a mutual dependence
between corruption, uncertainty and ￿nancial market imperfections: the ef-
fects of each of these factors are reinforced by the presence of the others.
Signi￿cantly, one typically presumes that, in general, corruption is higher,
uncertainty is greater and capital markets are more imperfect in the lesser
developed countries of the world. As our analysis reveals, this combination
of circumstances does not bode well for economic performance.
6 Conclusions
Our objective in this paper has been to analyse the e⁄ects of, and interactions
between, red tape and corruption in a simple model of occupational choice,
entry regulation and imperfect capital markets. Red tape is the set of rules
and procedures that private agents must legally comply with in order to
engage in entrepreneurial activity. Corruption is the payment of bribes by
agents to public o¢ cials for the purpose of avoiding red tape. Capital market
imperfections are the asymmetries of information between borrowers and
lenders about the returns to entrepreneurship. The basic problem for agents
is to choose whether or not to become entrepreneurs, given the terms and
conditions of borrowing (as speci￿ed by ￿nancial intermediaries), and the
terms and conditions of acquiring licenses (as set by bureaucrats). The former
include the provision for intermediaries to verify any bankruptcy claims of
agents, whilst the latter dictate whether licenses are issued based on agents￿
compliance with red tape or agents￿compliance in corruption.
According to our analysis, both red tape and corruption are costly for
agents, and both have the e⁄ect of reducing the number of entrepreneurs.
Importantly, however, the type of cost is not the same: red tape involves
20time and e⁄ort, whilst corruption entails monetary expenditures. It is be-
cause of this that only corruption a⁄ects ￿nancial market outcomes. It does
so by increasing both the probability of bankruptcy of borrowers and the ex-
pected veri￿cation cost of lenders. As a consequence, corruption compounds
the ine¢ ciencies of capital market frictions and exacerbates the e⁄ects of
uncertainty. At the same time, the more frictions there are and/or the more
uncertainty there is, the stronger are the e⁄ects of corruption.
It has been argued by others that corruption may have bene￿cial e⁄ects
by allowing agents to circumvent red tape. A major ￿ aw in this argument
is that it treats red tape as exogenous to bureaucrats￿decisions. In reality
the rules and regulations that agents confront are typically drawn up by the
very individuals who are able to exploit them for their own personal gain.
Far from being beyond bureaucrats￿control, red tape is an instrument of
choice that bureaucrats can use to extort bribes. Given this, then red tape
has as much to do with corruption as bribery, itself. Our analysis takes
this on board, providing a simple illustration of how the amount of red tape
is determined endogenously in accordance with the optimising behaviour of
rent-seeking o¢ cials.
The literature on corruption has been growing rapidly over recent years.
Whilst many issues have been addressed, many others remain outstanding.
One issue to which our analysis draws attention is the potential interactions
between two major forms imperfection that may exist in an economy - that
is, imperfections in governance and imperfections in ￿nancial markets. Sig-
ni￿cantly, it is among the poorest, least developed countries of the world
where these imperfections are most severe and most pervasive.
21References
Acemoglu, D. and T. Verdier, 1998. Property rights, corruption and the
allocation of talent: a general equilibrium approach. Economic Journal, 108,
1381-1403.
Acemoglu, D. and T. Verdier, 2000. The choice between market failures and
corruption. American Economic Review, 90, 194-211.
Ades, A. and R. Di Tella, 1997. The new economics of corruption: a survey
and some new results. Political Studies, 45, 496-515.
Ades, A. and R. Di Tella, 1999. Rents, competition and corruption. Ameri-
can Economic Review, 89, 982-993.
Aghion, P and P. Bolton, 1997. A theory of trickle-down growth and devel-
opment. Review of Economic Studies, 64, 151-172.
Aidt, T.S., 2003. Economic analysis of corruption. a survey. Economic
Journal, 113, 632-652.
Banerjee, A.V., 1997. A theory of misgovernance. Quarterly Journal of
Economics, 112, 1289-1332.
Banerjee, A.V. and A.F. Newman, 1993. Occupational choice and the process
of development. Journal of Political Economy, 101, 274-298.
Bardhan, P. 1984. The Political Economy of Development in India. Oxford
University Press, Oxford.
Bardhan, P., 1997. Corruption and development: a review of issues. Journal
of Economic Literature, 35, 1320-1346.
Bhagwati, J.N., 1993. India in Transition - Freeing the Economy. Clarendon
Press, Oxford.
Blackburn, K. and N. Bose, 2003. A model of trickle-down through learning.
Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, 27, 445-466.
22Blackburn, K., N. Bose and M.E. Haque, 2006. The incidence and persistence
of corruption in economic development. Journal of Economic Dynamics and
Control, 30, 2447-2467.
Blackburn, K. and G.F. Forgues-Puccio, 2007. Distribution and development
in a model of misgovernance. European Economic Review, forthcoming.
Brunetti, A., G. Kisunko and B. Weder, 1997. Institutional obsatcles to
doing business: region-by-region results from a world-wide survey of the
private sector. Working Paper No.1759, World Bank.
De Soto, H., 1989. The Other Path: The Invisible Revolution in the Third
World. Harper and Row, New York.
De Soto, H., 2000. The Mystery of Capital. Bantam Books, New York.
Djankov, S., R. La Porta, F.L. de Silances and A. Shleifer, 2000. The reg-
ulation of entry. Working Paper No.7892, National Bureau of Economic
Research.
Carillo, J.D., 2000. Corruption in hierarchies. Annales d￿ Economie et de
Statistique, 10, 37-61.
Ehrlich, I. and F.T. Lui, 1999. Bureaucratic corruption and endogenous
economic growth. Journal of Political Economy, 107, 270-293.
Fisman, R. and R. Gatti, 2002. Decentralisation and corruption: evidence
across countries. Journal of Public Economics, 83, 325-345.
Frechette, G.R., 2001. An empirical investigation of the determinants of
corruption: rent. competition and income revisted. Paper presented at the
2001 Canadian Economic Association Meeting.
Galor, O. and J. Zeira, 1993. Income distribution and macroeconomics.
Review of Economic Studies, 60, 35-52.
Guriev, S., 2004. Red tape and corruption. Journal of Development Eco-
nomics, 73, 489-504.
Gyimah-Brempong, K., 2002. Corruption, economic growth and income in-
equality in Africa. Economics of Governance, 3, 183-209.
23Huntington, S.P., 1968. Political Order in Changing Societies. Yale Univer-
sity Press, New Haven.
Jain, A.K. (ed.), 1998. The Economics of Corruption. Kluwer Academic
Publishers, Massachusettes.
Jain, A.K., 2001. Corruption: a review. Journal of Economic Surveys, 15,
71-121.
Kaufmann, D., 1997a. Corruption: the facts. Foreign Policy, 107, 114-131.
Kaufmann, D., 1997b. The missing pillar of a growth strategy for Ukraine:
institutional and policy reforms for private sector development. Discussion
Paper No.603, Harvard Institute for International Development.
Kau⁄man, D. and S.-J. Wei, 2000. Does ￿grease money￿speed up the wheels
of commerce? Working Paper No.00/64, International Monetary Fund.
Keefer, P. and S. Knack, 1997. Why don￿ t poor countries catch up? A
cross-national test of an institutional explanation. Economic Inquiry, 35,
590-602.
Klitgaard, R., 1988. Controlling Corruption. University of California Press,
Berkeley.
Klitgaard, R., 1990. Tropical Gangsters. Basic Books, New York.
Knack, S. and P. Keefer, 1995. Institutions and economic performance: cross-
country tests using alternative institutional measures. Economics and Poli-
tics, 7, 207-227.
Lambsdor⁄, J.G., 1999. Corruption in empirical research - a review. Working
Paper, Transparency International.
Lambsdor⁄, J.G, 2005. Consequences and causes of corruption: what do
we know from a cross-section of countries? Discussion Paper No. V-34-05,
University of Passau.
Le⁄, N.H., 1964. Economic development through bureaucratic corruption.
American Behavioural Scientist, 8, 8-14.
24Leys, C., 1970. What is the problem about corruption? In A.J. Heiden-
heimer (ed.), Political Corruption: Readings in Comparative Analysis, Holt
Reinehart, New York.
Li, H., L.C. Xu and H. Zou, 2000. Corruption, income distribution and
growth. Economics and Politics, 12, 155-182.
Lui, F., 1985. An equilibrium queuing model of corruption. Journal of
Political Economy, 93, 760-781.
Mauro, P., 1995. Corruption and growth. Quarterly Journal of Economics,
110, 681-712.
Mauro, P., 1997. The e⁄ects of corruption on growth, invsetment and govern-
ment expenditure: a cross-country analysis. In K.A. Elliott (ed.), Corruption
and the Global Economy, Institute for International Economics, Washington
D.C.
Mbaku, J.M., 2000. Bureaucratic and political corruption in Africa. Krieger
Publishing, Florida.
Meon, P.-G. and K. Sekkat, 2005. Does corruption grease or sand the wheels
of growth? Public Choice, 122, 69-97.
Montinola, G.R. and R.W. Jackman, 1999. Sources of corruption: a cross-
country study. British Journal of Political Studies, 32, 147-170.
Murphy, K.M., A. Shleifer and R. Vishny, 1991. The allocation of talent:
implications for growth. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 106, 503-530.
Paldam, M. 2002. The big pattern of corruption, economics, culture and
seesaw dynamics. European Journal of Political Economy, 18, 215-240.
Rauch, J.E. and P.B. Evans, 2000. Bureaucratic structure and bureaucratic
performance in less developed countries. Journal of Public Economics, 76,
49-71.
Rose-Ackerman, S., 1975. The economics of corruption. Journal of Public
Economics, 4, 187-203.
25Rose-Ackerman, S., 1978. Corruption: A Study in Political Economy. Aca-
demic Press.
Rose-Ackerman, S., 1999. Corruption and Government: Causes, Conse-
quences and Reform. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
Sachs, J.D. and A.M. Warner, 1997. Sources of slow growth in African
economies. Journal of African Economics, 6, 335-376.
Sarte, P.-D., 2000. Informality and rent-seeking bureaucracies in a model of
long-run growth. Journal of Monetary Economics, 46, 173-197.
Shleifer, A., 1997. Government in transition. European Economic Review,
41, 385-410.
Shleifer, A. and R. Vishny, 1993. Corruption. Quarterly Journal of Eco-
nomics, 108, 599-617.
Sjaifudian, S., 1997. Graft and the small business. Far Eastern Economic
Review, 160, 42, 32-50.
Tanzi, V., 1998. Corruption around the world: causes, scope and cures.
Working Paper No.98/63, International Monetary Fund.
Tanzi, V. and H. Davoodi, 1997. Corruption, public investment and growth.
Working Paper No.WP/97/139, International Monetary Fund.
Treisman, D., 2000. The causes of corruption: a cross-national study. Jour-
nal of Public Economics, 76, 399-457.
Wei, S., 2000. How taxing is corruption on international investors? Review
of Economics and Statistics, 82, 1-11.
Wilson, J.Q., 1989. Bureaucracy: what government agencies do and why they
do it. Basic Books, New York.
World Bank, 2002. Voices of the Firms 2000: Investment Climate and Gover-
nance Findings of the World Business Environment Survey (WBES). World
Bank, Washington D.C.
26World Bank, 2006. Doing Business in 2006. World Bank and the Interna-
tional Finance Corporation, Wahington D.C.
27